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Abstract 
This paper examines oil-dependence and civil conflict in Nigeria focusing on the economic dynamics of 
resource-induced conflicts. It identifies two dimensions to oil-related civil conflict in the country.  The first is 
the violent rent-seeking political violence that oil-availability generates between the various ethno-regional 
groups; the second is the Niger Delta crisis.  The former is linked to excessive government dependence on oil 
revenues, an institutionally unstable revenue allocation system, weak political institutional arrangements, 
lack of effective agencies of restraints to demand transparency and accountability on the part of political 
office holders, failure to translate oil wealth to sustainable growth and increased standard of living for a 
larger majority of Nigerians, and a defective property right structure in relation to mineral resource 
endowment.  Violence in the Niger Delta area is attributed, in the main, to weak institutional arrangements 
manifesting in poorly-conceived laws, lack of enforcement, ￿regulatory capture￿, and a marriage of interest 
between the State and oil companies which often encourage the State to use repressive measures against host 
communities in cases of disputes. There are also the looting and secession incentives as well as the rent-
seeking contests that oil-availability and the allure of ownership creates among local participants. Three 
factors (educational attainment, income level and asset possession) consistently explain the propensity to 
general violence among individuals in the region in the Ordered and Multinomial regressions on civil 
disobedience.  The paper concludes with a discussion of some measures that may be used to break the 
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In the early 1950s, some development economists, especially those associated with the Staple theory of 
growth, suggested that natural resource-abundance would help the ￿backward￿ states to overcome their 
capital shortfalls and provide revenues for their governments to provide public goods and lift citizens out of 
the doldrums of poverty. However, since the 1990s, a growing number of researches have established a link 
between resource-abundance and a number of socio-economic problems.  Natural resource-abundance has 
been associated with slow growth (Sachs and Warner, 1995), greater inequality and poverty for a larger 
majority of a country￿s population (Gravin and Hausmann, 1988; Ross 2004b), corruption of political 
institutions (Lane and Tornell, 1999; Ross, 1999, 2001), and more fundamentally, an increased risk of civil 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001)
1.   At the same time, there is an established link between resource-
motivated conflict and economic collapse (Collier and others, 2003; Skaperdas 1992; Deininger, 2003).   
 
Of all natural resources, oil has been found to have the highest risk of civil conflict because of the large rents 
it offers and the shocks to which the government and the national economy are exposed (Collier and Hoeffler, 
2005; Fearon and Laiton 2005).  According to Collier and Hoeffler (2002), 23 percent of states dependent on 
oil exports have experienced civil war in any 5-year period, a figure that dwarfs the 0.55 for countries without 
natural resources. However, while the experiences of oil exporters across the globe shows that oil-
dependence is most often a perilous development path, it is also evident that the negative outcomes of oil 
(and other resource) booms can be avoided. Norway, for example, has used the benefits from North Sea oil to 
earn the highest place on the UN human development rankings (Gary and Karl, 2003). Mexico and Malaysia 
have also fared well among developing oil- exporters.  
 
Nigeria is the largest oil-producer in Sub-Saharan Africa, with about 32 percent and 34.2 percent of Africa￿s 
oil and gas reserves respectively, the fifth largest exporting country in the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the fifth largest oil-exporting country to the US (eia.doe.gov/).  Like many 
oil-producing countries, the nation has not been spared the agony of recurring violent conflicts associated 
with the management of her oil resource.   In early 1967, oil-related disputes motivated an insurrection by a 
major ethnic group in the Niger Delta (the repository of almost all of the nation￿s oil and gas reserves)
2.   Less 
                                                               
1 According to Renner (2005), resource-driven conflicts killed more than 5 million people, forced 5 to 6 million people 
to flee to neighbouring countries and displaced about 15 million people inside the borders of their home countries during 
the 1990s alone. At the same time, ￿rebels￿, ￿warlords￿, corrupt governments and other predatory groups earned an 
estimated US $12 billion worldwide in revenues from marketing their countries natural resources. The incidence of civil 
conflicts was also highest in Africa, a fact that has been shown to be connected with the continent￿s heavy natural 
resource-dependence (Collier and Hoeffler, 2001; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).   
 
2  The reference is to the ￿rebellion￿ led by Issac Boro and some youths from the Ijaw ethnic extraction in February 
1967. 
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than a year after, the nation experienced a civil war (the Biafran war of 1967-70), which was not unconnected 
with disagreements over the sharing of oil revenues.  While the country has managed to maintain a fragile 
post-war peace, since the mid 1990s, there has been on-going violence and uprising in the Niger Delta region 
with a renewed call for self-determination and/or local control of oil resource.  These conflicts, often attended 
by kidnapping of foreign oil workers for ransom (hostage-taking), vandalization and sometimes blow-up of 
oil installations, have taken on frightening dimensions over the years. According to a report by Hamilton and 
others (2004), violence in the Niger Delta alone is estimated to have killed about 1000 persons a year 
between 1999 and 2004 on a par with conflicts in Chechnya and Columbia. In addition, there has been 
continuous tension between the various ethno-regional groups in the country (and also between local actors) 
over access to oil wealth through control of political power (see Table 1, where I attempt to summarize the 
many dimensions to oil-availability and civil conflict in Nigeria). The increasing incidence of oil-induced 
civil conflict is also taking place against the background of dismal economic performance and a high level of 
poverty, as well as an emerging ￿new African oil boom￿ (Gary and Karl, 2003: 5).  
 
This paper raises and seeks to provide answers to some fundamental questions: Why has oil wealth failed to 
translate into rapid economic growth and increased standard of living for majority of Nigerians? Why has oil 
become a catalyst for violent conflicts in the country? What role does oil-availability and other factors play in 
the propensity to civil disobedience among the people of the Niger Delta?  How may Nigeria escape from the 
￿oil curse￿?   Section 2 of the paper reviews developments related to oil-dependence and civil conflict in 
Nigeria. In section 3, I review related theoretical and empirical literature and develop a simple model of 
participation in civil disobedience in a resource-rich region. The basic predictions of the model are tested in 
section 4, while section 5 discusses findings, implications and recommendations and concludes.  
 
2. BACKGROUND  
2.1 The Nigerian Oil Industry 
Nigeria is a country with a population of over 120 million and approximately 300 ethnic groups. The three 
dominant ethnic groups are the Hausa/Fulani in the northern region, the Yoruba in the Southwest and the 
Igbo in the Southeast. Production of crude oil began in the country in December 1957.  Current estimates of 
Nigeria￿s oil and gas are about 27 billion barrels and 4.007 trillion cubic meters respectively (CIA Fact Book, 
2003).  Six major foreign oil companies presently dominate Nigeria￿s oil industry
3. The Nigerian 
government, through the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) established in 1971,   has 
traditionally held majority shareholding interests in these companies.  The NNPC operates two contractual 
                                                               
3 These are Shell, Mobil, Chevron, Elf, Agip and Texaco. In an effort to boost indigenous participation in the upstream 
sector, the Nigerian government granted about 38 licenses to private Nigerian companies between 1990 and 1994. 
However, indigenous companies have not being able to register their presence in the upstream sector of the Nigerian oil 
industry in any significant measure.    4
arrangements between the Nigerian Government and Oil companies (Table 2). Through these arrangements, 
the company receives 57 percent of total crude oil, most of which is subsequently exported.   
 
Until very recently, corruption has been the bane of the Nigerian oil industry as weaknesses in the control 
system, complicated tax rules and limited technical and institutional capability makes it difficult to monitor 
oil revenue (Emmanuel, 2004)
4.  Despite the high political risk, the escalation of civil conflicts and rise in oil-
related litigations over the last twelve to sixteen years, potential and actual profits in the country￿s oil 
industry has made it very attractive to foreign investors (Omalu, 1996:74; Frynas, 2000:20).  A number of 
authors (Frynas, 1998; Danler and Brunner, 1996; Fryner, 2000: 22) also point to hidden benefits of operating 
in the country owing to companies￿ operational control of Joint Venture Contracts (JVCs).   
 
The oil-related legal arrangements for the protection of local communities from the negative effects of oil 
exploration and production activities are summarized in Table 3, which also reveal their inadequacies. The 
Federal (and States) Environmental Protection Agencies (FEPA and SEPAs) are largely responsible for the 
enforcement of these legislations. However, the agencies have limited control over the oil industry
5 and are 
made ineffective by corruption, limited funding, weak monitoring and enforcement capacity, and limited 
qualified staff (World Bank 1995, Volume II, annex J; Fynas, 2000: 87)
6.  A release by the Nigerian 
Conservation Foundation (NCF), asserts that the poor management of Nigeria￿s environment is costing the 
country about $5 billion a year in ruined land and forest, most of which takes place at the Niger Delta 
(Reuters 19 September 2001).  According to the World Bank (1995), the three major constraints to the 
regulation of the energy and mineral sector in Nigeria are the absence of requirement for community 
participation in the planning and development of oil activities, corruption and inadequate compensation for 
damage to property, and the lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. In addition, unlike other oil-
                                                               
4  For example, according to Soremekun (1995), the Nigerian state lost N12.5billion in oil revenue as a result of 
fraudulent practices arising largely from what he calls ￿private middlemanship￿ during the civilian rule of 1973-83.  In 
comparison, the country￿s total government revenue from oil was N8.9 billion in 1979.  The Oxford Analytical Brief 
(9/7/1999) asserts also that the award of contracts for export sales was a notorious route of political patronage involving 
an estimated forty-one companies in the last year of the Abacha presidency.  Similarly, Africa Confidential (24 Oct 
1997) reveals that some US $3-4 billion were siphoned in oil deals by the ruling elite and its business partners in less 
than four years from November 1993, when the late dictator came to power (Africa Confidential, 24 Oct, 1997).  In 
contrast Nigeria￿s total government revenue from oil was US$12 billion in 1997 (Frynas, 2003. p 40).  Emmanuel 
(2004) also notes that since the mid 1990s, the official cost of producing oil in Nigeria has risen each year, despite a 
trend in the opposite direction in the international oil industry. 
 
5For example, in October 1996, the chief executive of the FEPA was arrested for fraud involving N1, 115 million 
(Guardian, Lagos, 27 January 1997).   
 
6 Several sections of the FEPA Act create loopholes which enable the offending oil company to escape legal 
responsibility for pollution (Adewale, 1992:58; Frynas, 2000:85).   
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producing countries, Nigeria lacks a separate statute for the conservation of oil (World Bank, 1995, Volume 
II, annex J; Frynas, 2000:90).   
            
2.2 Oil and Nigeria￿s Socio-Economic performance 
Over the last 25 years, Nigeria has received over $300 billion in oil revenues after deducting payments to the 
foreign companies (Gary and Karl, 2003; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).  Yet the country is marred 
in poverty.  In 1965 when Nigeria￿s oil revenue per capita was about US$33, per capita GDP was US$245.  
However, in 2000 when oil revenue grew to US$325 per capita, per capita GDP remained at the 1965 level, 
implying that oil revenue accumulated over the 35 year period between 1960 and 2000 did not add value to 
the standard of living of Nigerians (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).   Nigeria￿s per capita GDP (in 
PPP terms) was US $1, 113 in 1970.  It is estimated to have fallen to US$1, 084 in 2000, a figure which 
places the country among the fifteen poorest in the world.  The percentage of Nigerians living below the 
United Nation￿s US$1 per day absolute poverty line has risen from 27 in 1980 to 66 in 1996, and 70 in 2000.  
At the same time, income distribution has deteriorated sharply with more and more people pushed towards 
poverty and towards extreme wealth. With a Gini index of 50.6 in 1996-97, Nigeria￿s richest 10 percent 
controls 40.8 percent of the country￿s wealth and the poorest ten percent only a negligible 1.6 percent (CIA 
Fact Book, Nigeria, 2005), whereas in 1970 the top 10 and bottom 17 percent of the population earned the 
same amount of income (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).   
The Nigerian economy has also been substantially unstable (Table 4), a consequence of the heavy 
dependence on oil revenue, and the volatility in prices. The oil boom of the 1970s led to the neglect of non-
oil tax revenues, expansion of the public sector, and deterioration in financial discipline and accountability.  
In turn, oil-dependence exposed Nigeria to oil price volatility which threw the country￿s public finance into 
disarray
7.  According to Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), waste and ￿Dutch disease￿ manifesting in 
rapid capital accumulation and negative Total Factor Productivity (TFP) characterized Nigeria￿s forty year 
post-independence development experience. While capacity utilization averaged about 77 percent in 1975, it 
had declined to about 50 in 1983 and until very recently has languished at about 35 percent since the mid 




                                                               
7 For example, the Nigerian government￿s budget for 1998 was based on the assumption of an average oil price of US$ 
17/b.  But in the same month the budget was announced, the crude oil price fell from about US$16 to US$14.73/b, thus 
threatening the viability of the entire budget (Newswatch, 16 Feb 1998).  Also, in the first quarter of 1998 alone, Nigeria 
reportedly lost US$700 million as a result of the global drop in oil prices out of the US$8 billion lost by all OPEC 
counties combined (AP, 19 April, 1998).   
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2.3 Oil and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships in Nigeria 
Since oil revenue dominates Nigeria￿s Federation Account (Fig.1), the sharing of oil rents govern 
intergovernmental fiscal relations in the country with an on-going tension between agitations by oil-
producing states for greater share of resources and demands for redistribution from other regions, particularly 
relatively less endowed ones.  Also the history of successive revenue allocation arrangements in Nigeria has 
been most unstable and accompanied by distrust, inadequate information flows, a lack of transparency, and 
uncertain accountability (Ahmed and Singh, 2003). The authors argue that the present intergovernmental 
fiscal arrangement prevailing in Nigeria generates a large vertical imbalance in favour of the center (Fig.2) 
while allocations to the states do not depict any clear pattern of redistribution between regions or any 
correlation with relative needs.  While in theory the arrangement takes into account the effort of each state to 
mobilize internal revenue, in practice, an equal weight is given for this variable in allocations.  Thus, apart 
from failing to create an incentive to increase states￿ efforts at revenue generation, the federation transfer 
does not appear to have any significant equalization effect.  
Oil-availability has also fundamentally altered governance in Nigeria.  Like most other oil-producing 
countries, Nigeria has suffered from poor institutional quality stemming from oil (Table 5), a factor which 
according to Sala-i-Martin and Sambaramanian (2003) has contributed to lower long run annual growth of 
0.5 percent.  Indeed the nation￿s politics has been fundamentally shaped by securing access to oil rents.  As 
so aptly described by Suberu and Diamond (2001), ￿in forty years of independence the country has  fashioned 
six separate federal constitutions, witnessed the rise and replacement of eleven different national 
administrations, and straddled the political poles between democratic pluralism and military 
authoritarianism, between pseudo federalism and institutionally balanced federalism, between Westminster-
style parliamentary government and American-type presidentialism, and between inter-ethnic reconciliation, 
and fierce, often violent, ethnic conflict￿.  Crude oil is almost exclusively located in the South eastern part of 
the country, which is home to some minority ethnic groups
8 but these groups have traditionally wielded little 
political power.  In contrast, until very recently, the nation￿s political economy has been dominated by the 
North (Table 6).  
 
2.4 Oil and the Niger Delta Crisis 
Current oil exploration and production activities in Nigeria is concentrated in the Niger Delta, a wetland of 
about 70000 sq km spread over a number of ecological zones along the Gulf of Guinea, and the third largest 
                                                               
8 The Ijaws, Ikwerres, Edos, Itsekiris, Urhobos, Isokos, Ndonis, Andonis, Ibibios, Etches, Ogonis and other small ethnic 
groups. 
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wetland in the world (Tell, Lagos, 6 September 2004)
9.  The region alone accounts for over 90 percent of the 
nation￿s oil revenue and its gas reserves are now touted as the nation￿s next greatest potential revenue earner.   
Geological research shows that the Niger Delta (both onshore and offshore areas) is particularly conducive to 
the formation and accumulation of oil and gas (Hyne, 1995:90-98). Despite this abundant natural resources, 
the region is said to be poorer than the national average (Emmanuel, 2004; Tell, 6 September 2004; Gary and 
Karl, 2003: 50) and according to Clark (2005) has remained ￿the most backward and underdeveloped region 
in Nigeria￿.    
 
Conflicts between oil companies and local communities in the Niger Delta have basically revolved around 
land ownership and compensation for land appropriation as well as compensation for environmental damages 
due to oil operations
10. In addition, there has been frequent disputes over the causes of oil spills and whether 
oil companies are eligible to pay compensation, and if so, to what extent.  At the national level conflicts have 
centered on the sharing of oil revenues and the allocation of public goods between various ethnoregional 
groups, and the failure of the Nigerian government to take adequate measures to mitigate the environmental 
effects of oil operations on local communities or to adequately compensate for such damages.  Beginning 
with the Ogoni uprising of the late 1980s to the Kiama Declaration by the Ijaws in 1998 and the emergence 
of militant groups such as the Niger Delta People￿s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) and the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), protests in the Niger Delta has taken on a more violent and 
militarized form.  
 
As a result of this rising militancy, the number of community disruptions to oil operations in Nigeria has risen 
enormously over the last five to ten years. Some estimates suggest that militancy and protest cut onshore oil 
production by a third in 2001-2003 (UN IRIN, 2003, Gary and Karl, 2003). Apart from the loss in oil 
production, there have been accompanying financial losses to oil companies, a move that has prompted oil 
companies  to begin to redirect their attention to offshore oil activities (Gary and Karl, 2003).   
                                                               
9 Officially, the Niger Delta is made up of nine states and has an estimated population of about 26.7million (Tell, 6 
September 2004).  These states are Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers.  Six of 
the States (Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, and Rivers) constitute the South-South geopolitical zone 
(SSZ) of Nigeria, and inhabits the so-called minority ethnic groups. Two of the states that constitute the Niger Delta 
(Abia and Imo) are situated in the southeastern part of Nigeria while the remaining one of the nine states (Ondo) is 
located in the Southwest.  Distinction is sometimes made between the official Niger delta and the geographic Niger 
Delta consisting only of Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states.  
10 For example, a report by the Essential Action and Global Exchange (2000) document cases of environmental pollution 
arising from gas flaring, acid rain and oil/gas pipeline leaks.  Depending on the location, oil spills can poison water, 
destroy vegetation and kill living organisms (van Dessel, 1995; Amajor 1985).  The situation is made worse in the Niger 
Delta where as a result of floods; waters carry the oils to villages and onto farm lands (Moffat and Linden 1995:527).  
This also renders the cleaning of oil spills all the more difficult.  According to a Report prepared by the Center for Social 
and Corporate Responsibility, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, (Emmanuel, 2004), less than 50 percent of oil spills in the Niger 
Delta are cleaned up.  A 2001 Report by the Minister of State for Environment also shows that about 68 percent of the 
associated gas production in the Niger Delta is flared (The Guardian, Lagos, 1 October 2001).   8
 
In response to increasing anti-oil protests and under pressure of public opinion, the Nigerian government and 
foreign oil companies have made attempts to increase their developmental commitments to the Niger Delta. 
For example, the government established the Oil and Mineral Development Commission (OMPADEC) and 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 1992 and 2001 respectively
11. In addition, Shell, being 
the operator of the NNPC/Shell/Elf/Agip joint ventures, carries out community development projects on 
behalf of the organizations.  The federal government (being the majority share holder in the joint venture) 
contributes significantly (about 60 percent) to these initiatives, a factor which some analysts have argued had 
made the government to neglect the oil-producing communities for so long (THISDAYonline, 4 August 2003; 
28 July 2003).  
 
Since the 1990s, the scope of oil companies￿ development activities in the oil-producing communities has 
been greatly expanded. (It is claimed that oil companies even pay some individuals in oil-producing 
communities on a regular basis to induce peaceful behaviour!).    However, some pieces of evidence (Danler 
and Brunner, 1996:23; Tell, 27January 1997; The Guardian, Lagos, 18 January 1998; Frynas, 2000:53;   
THISDAYonline, 28 July 2003.) seem to suggest that many oil companies engage in community development 
projects primarily for public relations purposes rather than the need to address the real life problems of local 
communities; sometimes advertise projects that are non-existent; and artificially inflate figures quoted to have 
been spent on community development in order to avoid tax payments. The Report by the Center for Social 
and Corporate Responsibility, Port Harcourt, Nigeria (Emmanuel, 2004), shows that development assistance 
to local communities by oil companies are often philanthropic, do not follow any needs assessment, have no 
participating rural appraisal, and as such, lack ownership and sustainability.    
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
11 The NDDC is an attempt to break away from past practices and results, and is supported by the World Bank and the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The agency is funded by the federal government and the oil companies.  
While the government transfers 15 percent of the money due the oil-producing communities under the 13 percent 
derivation rule to the agency, each of the oil and gas companies operating in the Niger Delta contributes 3 percent of its 
annual budget.  In turn, the NDDC adopts an allocation formula, whereby 60 percent of funds received is spent in 
proportion to the amount of oil produced in each state. The governing board of the NDDC is appointed by the President 
with representatives drawn from the oil-producing state governments, other States, federal government agencies, and oil 
companies.  While the NDDC has carried out many laudable projects in the Niger Delta in the short five years of its 
existence and has received various local and international recognitions, there are reports that the agency￿s operations 
have been greatly hindered by inadequate funding.  In addition, the composition of the board without the visible 
presence of members of the civil society from the oil-producing areas and the absence of a well defined arrangement for 
monitoring and evaluation, has limited the agency￿s effectiveness and popularity. Indeed, there have been allegations of 
biasedness in the allocation of projects by the Commission, with claims that past and current chairmen have influenced 
projects in favour of their own states and communities to the neglect of communities that are even in greater need.  
Recently, the Delta State House of Assembly committed a bill seeking to establish a state-owned oil-producing areas 
development commission 
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Also, while both the oil companies and the Nigerian government have been willing to grant some financial 
concessions to the oil-producing communities at various times, a more frequent response to protests by 
communities has been the use of repressive security measures (HRW 1995; Frynas, 2003:54; Reuters, 31 
December 1998; Phone News International, 25 January 1999; AP, 1 February 1999; HRW  1999b;  Tell, 
Lagos, December 1999).  Oil companies have in turn, supported the repression of community protests, and in 
some cases instigated the Nigerian security forces against oil communities
12. The Nigerian government has 
also failed to take any positive steps to implement the reports of the various Commissions of Enquiry set up 
at various times to investigate cases of large-scale human rights violations by oil companies and security 
agents (IPCR, 2003).  Based on the implementation of the provision of the 1999 constitution that not less than 
13 percent of oil revenue be transferred to oil-producing states on the basis of derivation, there has been 
significant jump in the share of oil revenues going to these states
13.  However as Gary and Karl (2003) rightly 
observe, a lack of transparency and mismanagement pervades States and Local government structures, so that 
it cannot be said that the massive flow of funds have largely benefited the local people.  
 
 
3. REVIEW OF THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE   
 
Three major lines of argument have been employed in the theoretical literature to explain the ￿resource curse￿ 
(the tendency of natural resource abundance/dependence to immiserise growth and development).   One line 
follows what has come to be known as the ￿Dutch disease￿
14.  The second focuses on the volatility effect of 
natural resource export-dependence (IDB, 1995; Gravin and Hausmann, 1996; Ramey and Ramey, 1995; 
Aizenren and Manon, 1999; and Caballero, 2000), while the third discusses the rent-seeking effects. The rent-
seeking view assert that resource-dependence (especially oil) often lead to a ￿vicious development cycle￿ 
whereby all actors (public and private, domestic and foreign) have overwhelming incentives to seek links 
with the state in order to share in the resource pie.  This incentive for rent-seeking penalizes productive 
activities, distorts the entire economy and hinders economic growth.  In a dynamic setting, this may produce 
a ￿voracity effect￿ (Lane and Tornell, 1999). 
                                                               
12 The ￿Umuechem massacre￿ which occurred in Rivers State in 1991, is a commonly-cited example. 
13 For example, a total sum of N886.570 billion is reported to have been transferred to the nine states of the Niger Delta 
in just a period of five years between June 1999 and July 2004, apart from the allocations to the local governments in the 
state (Vanguard, Lagos, 23 November 2004).   
14 The ￿Dutch disease￿ thesis asserts that an increase in resource-based revenues (due to a boom) leads to an 
appreciation in the local currency, increases the capacity of the country to import tradables and also enlarges the 
demand for other goods and services, including non-tradables which must be produced locally.  This forces a structural 
adjustment in the domestic economy as resources are diverted out of the non-resource tradable sector (represented by 
manufacturing) into the production of non-tradables.  Thus typically, resource booms lead to the contraction of the non-
resource (manufacturing) sector (Hausmann and Rigobon, 2003).  
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Similarly, explanations of the causal mechanism linking natural resources to civil conflict have followed four  
prominent lines of argument: a ￿grievance hypothesis￿ (Klare, 2001:208),   ￿weak states￿ hypothesis (Fearon 
and Laitin, 2003, Karl 1997; Mahdavy, 1970), a ￿separatist incentive￿ hypothesis (Ross, 2003; Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2002, and Le Billion, 2001), and a ￿looting￿ hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004).  By the 
￿grievance mechanism￿, resource extraction creates grievances among local population due to land 
expropriation, environmental hazards, inadequate job opportunities and social disruption accompanying 
labour migration and perceived injustice in the distribution of resource rents. By the ￿state weakness￿ 
mechanism, natural resource (particularly oil) wealth increases the probability of civil war by weakening the 
state￿s bureaucracy (Fearon and Laitin, 2002); by creating a state that is less responsive to its citizens 
(Mahdavy, 1970); and by impeding the ability of states to resolve social conflicts (Karl, 1997; Fearon and 
Laitin 2002).  
 
According to the ￿looting￿ mechanism, natural resources increase the risk of civil conflicts by providing a 
source of finance for nascent rebel groups either by extracting and selling the commodities directly or by 
extorting money from extractive firms, which unlike manufacturing firms are location-specific
15.  By the 
￿separatist￿ incentive mechanism, resource wealth increases the risk of a secessionist war by giving residents 
in a resource-rich region an incentive to form a separate state (Ross, 2004a). Since natural resource income 
accrues to ownership rather than to effort, ￿ownership of a natural resource discovery has some of the same 
appeal as winning a lottery￿ (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002b). Furthermore, because the state controls the 
revenues from natural resources, the state itself represents booty (Addison et al, 2003).  Thus apart from 
motivating secessionist civil wars, natural resource-abundance may lead to a whole range of pathologies, 
such as adverse regime changes, and other manifestations of state failure.  Other authors (e.g., Goldstone and 
others, 2003; Goodhand, 2003; Gurr and others, 2001:13; Collier and Hoeffler (2002); Collier and others, 
2003:101-25), emphasize the role of economic development.  Collier and others (2003:101-25), for example, 
provide empirical evidence to show that a country in economic decline, dependent on primary commodity 
exports and having a low per capital income that is unequally distributed, is at a higher risk of a civil war.   
 
The emerging consensus on the study of natural resources and civil conflict emphasizes the role of 
institutions. Natural resource abundance easily leads to violent conflicts in environments where institutional 
arrangements are weak (Ron, 2005).  For example, governments in resource-abundant countries may face a 
                                                               
15 In Columbia, for example, oil pipelines were bombed 98 times in 2000 alone. In addition, rebel groups are said to 
have earned a whopping US$1.5billion from kidnapping ransoms between 1991 and 1999, a windfall which enabled a 
group (the National Liberation Army) to grow from fewer than 40 members to at least 3,000 (Dunning and Wirspa, 
2002; Ross, 2003b). 
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number of constraints which makes the looting of natural resource rents a more ￿profitable￿ strategy
16.    In 
general, availability of large resource rents easily provides finance for patronage, reduce the need for 
taxation, and undermine checks and balances in environments where institutions that can restrain behaviour 
are lacking.  Contrarily when there is the right set of institutions,  those who control the state employ political 
power not to extract wealth but to support the creation of wealth as by safeguarding property rights and 
policing behaviour of those who might be inclined to violate them (Bates and others, 2003). 
 
In addition multinational oil companies are not only the main private economic actors in most oil-dependent 
less-developed countries, but are also the main political brokers. This often has implication for the political 
and economic trajectories of these countries
17.  It also means, however, that oil companies may have to 
confront a number of extremely difficult dilemmas, which present alternative lines of actions with 
implications for both host communities and governments (Mack, 2003).  In this context, the prevailing state 
of socio-economic development and institutional quality is likely to determine strategies and actions. 
   
The incentive for host communities to approach the courts in cases of disputes would also depend on the 
remedies available, the cost of judicial actions, delay in getting court judgments and individuals￿ confidence 
in the judiciary as an impartial administrator of the rule of law. Where legal institutions are weak or there is 
open complicity between extractive firms and the government against a community for example, the latter 
may turn to ￿informal regulations￿ (Hettige and others, 1996; Pergal and Wheeler, 1996) such as peaceful 
rallies or protests, blocking of oil production processes, vandalizatioin of oil installations, and kidnapping oil 
company￿s staff either for ransom or to give strength to other demands.  The latter may even be a preferred 
option if civil disobedience is believed to yield larger payoffs than peaceful behaviour.   Thus conflict rather 
than co-operation or bargaining over resource wealth may emerge as a rational, though inefficient, outcome 
of repeated interactions between governments, extractive firms and host communities in resource-rich regions 
(Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2000; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1996; Skaperdas, 2001).  And where this is 
greed-motivated, it may be difficult to achieve any enforceable, credible or time-consistent bargain 
(Sambanis, 2004).  This breakdown in bargaining may lead to a general case of loss of order within a society 
                                                               
16 According to Collier and Hoeffler (2005), elites in power may choose to loot resource rents rather than invest in the 
public good of growth in four circumstances: (i) when time horizons are short, (ii) when the elite is narrowly based on a 
fixed and identifiable support group, (iii) when the public assets (e.g. resource rents) is very valuable relative to the 
income of the society and (iv) when democratic electoral competition degenerates into patronage.  The temptation for 
the government to deviate from ￿prudential behaviour￿ may also be overwhelming when power can be readily 
transferred into wealth through resource appropriation and in the face of limited economic opportunities.  Predatory 
behaviour by government can also result from advances from extractive firms which the government finds irresistible 
(i.e. ￿government capture￿). 
 
17 Many studies have shown, for example, that powerful oil companies, including domestic ones, come to play a 
disproportionate role in the decision-making of oil-exporting countries, a role which permits them to sometimes 
manipulate legal structures in their favour (Karl,1997). 
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and its subsequent movement along a continuum between order and violent disorder (Brough and Elliot, 
200*).  
 
3.1 A simple Model of Participation in Civil disobedience  
I posit that the willingness of an individual to participate in various acts of civil disobedience (￿informal 
regulation￿) is dependent on some individual and community-level characteristics that define the expected 
benefits and the cost of participation.  Let economic agents be endowed with a unit of labour, l, stock of 
human capital, h, as well as physical capital or asset, k.  Each agent can allocate her labour endowment either 
to productive activities (lp) or to civil disobedience (ld) so that  
lp + ld = 1                       (1)
18                                                             
The benefit derived from productive work is  
U (lp) = f (wp)                                   (2) 
where              wp (h, k, g, a )                                   (3) 
∂U (lp) /∂( wp ), ∂ wp /∂ h,  ∂ wp /∂ k, ∂ wp /∂ g, ∂ wp /∂ a >0 
In other words, benefit from productive work is a function of the wages in the productive sector (wp).  This in 
turn depends on endowments of human and physical capital and on the economy￿s growth rate, g, which 
defines the opportunities in the economy and the labour market conditions.  Again, since many individuals in 
resource-rich communities are likely to be engaged in the informal sector and land-based activities, I add a, 
which measures the exogenously-determined productivity of agricultural lands.  This is independent of the 
individual￿s levels of h and k (which also determine productivity) and may be affected by the negative effects 
of resource extraction.  
The benefit derived from civil disobedience is given by  
U (ld) =  f (oil,ατ)        ( 4 )  
  α (pg, inf),   0< α<1         ( 5 )  
                                                               
18 An individual may engage in productive work and intermittent acts of civil disobedience.  However, the focus here is 
endemic violence, i.e., when violence and rent-seeking activities becomes an ￿occupation￿ of a sort. This is not a remote 
possibility. Results from Author￿s survey (March, 2005) reveal that in Bayelsa state, for example, violence has become a 
way of life and about the only way communities are able to get the attention of multinational oil companies and the 
government to attend to some of their demands.  The erstwhile governor of the State, Alayemesie, once lamented the 
fact that he had spent the greater part of his tenure settling oil-related disputes (Issac-Onilu, This Day, April 22, 2005).    
Violence is often used to force oil companies to the negotiation table where they would be expected to make long run 
commitments and offer immediate and temporary concessions.   
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      ∂U (ld)/∂ τ<0, ∂α /∂ (pg)>0, ∂α /∂ (inf)>0 
Oil availability (oil), especially when it is onshore and ￿obstructable￿
19, offers potential benefits from civil 
disobedience in terms of the possibilities of getting money from extractive firms through ￿legitimate 
demands￿ such as compensations, and from extortions and ransoms; and also from the sale of bunkered oil 
from vandalized pipeline etc.  However, it incurs a cost (τ) (the possibility of government repression in the 
case of ￿legitimate demands￿, and the punitive measures that would be applied when caught in the case of 
involvement in other criminal activities). This cost is incurred with a probability α which increases in 
government￿s presence (pg), and in the endowment of social infrastructure in community (inf)
20. For low 
values of h, k, g, and a, and sufficiently low values of pg and inf , U(ld) > U(lp), in which case agents will 
prefer to allocate the whole of l to civil disobedience rather than to productive work
21.   
   
3.2 Hypotheses 
 
The following hypotheses can be derived from the theoretical and empirical literature and from the 
predictions of the model above  
 
H1:   Oil-related civil conflict episodes in the Niger Delta can be traced to institutional 
and policy failures.  
 
H2:  Oil-availability in community of residence increases the propensity to civil 
disobedience among individuals in the region by creating an incentive for rent-seeking 
and/or generating negative environmental spill-overs that create grievance.  
 
H3:  A larger endowment of social infrastructure at the community-level and/or 
government presence in community reduces the propensity to civil disobedience among 
by reducing grievance and/or increasing the risk of participation. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
19 According to Ross (2002), a resource is obstructable ￿when its transportation can be easily blocked by a small number 
of individuals with few weapons￿, and is relatively unobstructable ￿when it can be blocked with many soldiers and 
heavy equipment￿.  Oil and natural gas are highly obstructable when they have to be transported long distance through 
above-ground pipelines and trucks. This is majorly the case in Nigeria￿s Delta. 
 
20 Government￿s presence in terms of government establishment in community serves as a liaison centre and helps to 
facilitate flow of information between community and state capital.  It also means that the government can easily get 
information on developments in the community, a factor which increases the risk associated with civil disobedience.  By 
the same token, a higher endowment of social infrastructure assists in the policing of the community.  
 
21 In reality, this decision will be affected by the individuals￿ attitude to risk and subjective discount rate. 
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H4:   A higher educational attainment, a higher income level, possession of a valuable 
asset, being a student or apprentice, reduces the propensity to civil disobedience among 
individuals by increasing the opportunity cost of participation.  
   
H5:  Unemployment status, personal socio-economic exclusion, creates personal 
grievances which increase the propensity to civil disobedience among individuals.   
 
H6:  Higher episodes of violent conflict in community of residence increase the 




4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
The study presents a two-fold analysis.  The first (which is mainly descriptive) attempts to provide an 
empirical test of H1 using conflict episodes drawn from selected communities in the Niger Delta. The results 
(summarized in Table 7) lend broad support for H1. The second is an econometric analysis of the 
determinants of the propensity to various outcomes on civil disobedience among individuals in the region, 
and provides an empirical test of H2 through H6. 
 
4.1 Sample Design, Data collection Methods and Sample Characteristics 
The sample was drawn from twenty-three communities in 12 local government areas of three States in the 
Niger Delta (Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers) which account for the bulk of Nigeria￿s oil production and have 
been the sites of most oil-related civil conflicts in the country over the last six to eight years.  The first phase 
of the field study involved carrying out a preliminary investigation of the selected communities and 
conducting focused group discussions (FGDs) and personal interviews with individuals and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). The second phase involved administering 1,500 structured 
questionnaires on selected males
22 (with a bias towards those who by casual observation are above 15 years 
old) using systematic sampling technique
23.  The exercise yielded a functional sample size of 1337 
individuals.  
                                                               
22 The focus on males was deliberate.  While females (women) have been involved in oil protests in the Niger Delta in 
recent times, young males remain the best recruits for armed struggle (Collier, 2000; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2000).   
 
23 First, we selected some catchments (areas), where youths could easily be found (e.g., community halls, motor parks).  
Secondly, we determined the number of streets (or major streets) in the community and allocated a fixed number of 
questionnaires to each street.  We then determined the residential houses/business premises to be visited using a simple 
formula j = N/n, where N is the number of residential houses/business premises in the street and n is the number of 
questionnaires to be administered. Only, one individual is selected from each premise.  In order to avoid any bias arising 
from group influence, selected individuals in the catchments areas were interviewed separately.   The questionnaire was 
initially pre-tested on twenty-five respondents randomly selected from two communities in Delta state.     15
 
Descriptive analyses of the sample (Tables 8) show significant variations in communities in terms of oil-
availability, social infrastructure and conflict history; and in income and socio-economic access (personal 
inclusion) among individuals.  Only 27.67 percent of sampled individuals are unemployed but income level is 
generally low. With a mean income class of 0.99, 69.36 percent of the sampled population earns below N7, 
000 (about US $51.47) and 90.08 percent below N15, 000 (about US $110) monthly.   Formal educational 
attainment is also low with only 9.27 percent having completed tertiary education and 51.49 percent never 
going beyond primary educational level.   Economic security appears to be most pressing need individuals 
(Table 9).  Most communities surveyed lacked basic amenities. About 67 percent of houses in surveyed 
communities depend on neighbours￿ goodwill, water vendors, rains, streams and rivers for their water needs, 
about 28 percent get water from centrally-located taps/boreholes, while only a low of about 5 percent have 
private wells or boreholes.  Similarly, about 22 percent of communities have no electricity supply, 11 percent 
have electricity provided by their respective state governments, 28 percent derive electricity from the national 
grid, while the remaining 39 percent depends on oil companies for electricity, which is often rationed. In the 
same vein, about 72 percent of houses surveyed either has no toilet facility or uses pit latrine or bowl buckets, 
while the remaining 28 percent uses flush toilet (including non-automated flush type) (Table 10). 77.74 
percent of communities surveyed have experienced at least one violent conflict
24 over the past ten years from 
the date of survey.  
 
4.3 Variables and Data 
The dependent variable (civildisobedience) is a discrete variable indicating that the respondent is willing to 
be engaged in one of three outcomes on civil disobedience (peaceful protest: peacepro; violent protest and 
associated criminality, such as pipeline vandilization etc.: violence; and armed struggle for self 
determination: rebellion) The variable takes on a value of 0 if respondent does not indicate a willingness to 
participate in any one of the three outcomes,  1 if respondent indicates willingness to participate in a peaceful 
protest but not in a violent protest or armed struggle, 2 if  respondent indicates willingness to participate in a 
violent protest and/or associated criminality but not in an armed struggle, and 3 if respondent indicates 
willingness to participate in an armed struggle
25.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
24 I define a violent conflict as one involving destruction of life and/or property. 
 
25 Three questions were used to generate the data on civildisobedience. (1)  Assuming you come across a burst petroleum 
pipeline, what are you most likely to do? (2) Will you be willing to participate in a protest to demand that the people of 
your community be allowed to own and manage the oil in their land? (3)  Will you be willing to join a group that will be 
able to fight to ensure that your community and other communities in the Niger Delta own and manage the oil in their 
lands? Once a respondent expressed a propensity to ￿tap￿ from a busted pipeline in (1), I ignore whatever response is 
given to (2) and moved to (3).  If the response to (3) is ￿No￿, I attach a value of 2 to civildisobedience. If, on the other 
hand, the response to (3) is ￿Yes￿, the variable takes on a value of 3.  Contrarily, if the respondent reveals no propensity 
to ￿tap￿ from a busted pipeline, I consider (2).  If the response to (2) is ￿Yes￿ (rather than ￿Yes, if it is not violent￿), and  16
Independent Variables 
Individual-level variables 
unemployment is a dummy measuring the state of unemployment.  It takes the value of 1 if the individual is 
currently unemployed and is not a full-time student or apprentice, and 0 otherwise.   
studentship is a dummy indicating that respondent is currently a full-time student in a formal educational 
institution or apprentice in a vocational training. 
education is a discrete variable that measures the level of respondent￿s formal educational attainment.  The 
variable takes on a value of 3 if respondent completed tertiary education, 2 if respondent completed 
secondary but not tertiary education, 1 if respondent completed primary but not secondary education, and 0 if 
respondent has no formal education. 
asset is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if respondent has a physical asset and 0 otherwise. Three types 
of assets are considered: landed properties and farmlands, motor vehicles and motor bikes, and machineries 
that could be used to generate income.  
income is respondent￿s average monthly income if employed. The variable takes discrete values ranging from 
1 to 7 based on respondent￿s income bracket. The purpose of measuring income level by income groups 
rather than the absolute value of income is to avoid having a very large standard deviation for the variable 
relative to others (Long, 1997:54). 
inclusion is a measure of respondent￿s personal and economic access. It is a discrete variable derived by 
summing values on some measures of socio-economic access, which includes access to three basic amenities: 
pipe borne water, modern toilet facility, and electricity. Others are access to education (if respondent is of 
school-going age) or access to employment (by type), and access of children or siblings to secondary or 
primary education. The variable takes on values from 0 to 11. 
Community-level characteristics 
oil is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the community in which respondent is resident has a  proven  
oil endowment and 0 otherwise. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
the response to (3) is ￿No￿, I attach a value of 2 to civildisobedience.  On the other hand, if the response to (2) is ￿Yes, if 





infrastructure is a discrete variable that measures the extent to which the community the individual is resident 
is endowed with physical (social) infrastructure.  The value is derived by summing up available tarred 
(paved) roads (measured in kilometers and scaled down by the minimum kilometer of tarred road in the 
communities covered), the number of functional public schools and hospitals, and other public projects such 
as town halls or recreational sites available in the community; and ranges from 2 to 22.  
government is  a discrete variable denoting government  presence in the community.  This is measured by the 
number of state or federal government establishments in the community. Its value ranges from 0 to 2. 
conflict is  a variable measuring the extent to which the individual￿s community of residence has been 
exposed to violent conflicts.  The value is determined by the number of violent conflicts the community has 
experienced in the last ten years from the date of the survey (March, 2005).   
delta is a geographic dummy indicating that respondent￿s community is geographically located in Delta state.   
rivers is a geographic dummy indicating that respondent￿s community is geographically located in Rivers 
state. 
 
There are some limitations associated with the data employed in the study, given the absence (or 
inaccessibility) of official data on most variables. For example, decision on what should be the basis for 
measuring  inclusion and the weights attached to each of the factors used is arbitrary, while the data on 
infrastructure basically ignores the quality of existing social infrastructures.  The asset dummy also ignores 
the number or quantity of assets an individual may posses (e.g., an individual with one residential building is 
treated the same as one with two or more residential buildings) and the variation in the quality of each asset 
type while information on conflict are taken as given by community leaders with verification only where 
possible.  In spite of these, the data is considered fairly reliable for the purpose of this study.  
 
 
4.4 Estimation Techniques 
I use two modeling approaches (the Multinomial Logit and the Ordered Logit) to estimate the propensity to 
civil disobedience in the region.  The general form of the multinomial model can be expressed in the equation 
   Pij   =  _e 
Xiβj 
                    j 
                  ∑  e
Xiβk                                                                       (6) 
                                          k=1 
 
Where Pij is the probability that individual i choose outcome j; xi is a vector of individual and community-
level characteristics (variables), j is the number of outcomes, and βj measures the contribution of  variable i to 
the occurrence of j.   The multinomial model assumes that the various outcomes (the j￿s) are various  18
unordered alternatives. The logit version of the model (which is employed in the analysis that follows) is 
inexpensive to estimate and the logit probabilities can be easily interpreted (Train 1993).  
 
When the multinomial choice variables are inherently ordered, the multinomial model will lead to a loss of 
efficiency (Greene, 2003:736; Long, 1997:149). It seems rational to assume that violence escalates from low 
to high levels (Sambanis, 2004; Reagan and Norton, 2005; O￿Brien, 2002) in which case the multinomial 
model will be inadequate. The Ordered Logit Model takes account of the ordered nature of outcomes on the 
dependent variable. The probability of any observed outcome in this model is 
Pr (yi = m│xi) = F  (τm - xi β) ￿ F(τm-1- xi β)                           (7) 
where  yi = m is the outcome observed for individual i, for a given xi,  F is the cumulative distribution function 
assumed (in this case the logistic distribution), the τ￿s are thresholds or cutpoints,  and the extreme categories 
1 and j are defined by open-ended intervals with τ0 = -∞ and τj = ∞.  To employ this modeling approach, I 
assume that the three outcomes on civil disobedience (peacepro, violence and rebellion) indicate a movement 
from one to a more intense form of civil disobedience. Thus 3>2>1 in an ordinal sense. I also made some 
assumptions concerning the responses to the questions that form the basis of the data on the dependent 
variable




Four individual-level and two community-level factors determine the propensity to civil disobedience in the 
ordered regression model (Table 11).  The propensity to civil disobedience reduces in income level (income), 
educational attainment (education), asset possession (asset), socio-economic inclusion (inclusion) and the 
endowment of social infrastructure (infrastructure) at the community-level, but increases in oil availability 
(oil).  However, from the multinomial regressions (Table 12), infrastructure and oil appear to matter only for 
rebellion.  Also conflict appears to increase the propensity to each outcome on civil disobedience in the 
multinomial model, while unemployment tends to increase the propensity to participate in peaceful protest but 
does not appear to significantly affect the willingness to participate in violence (and associated criminality)  
                                                               
26 I assume that (i) An individual who is willing to ￿tap￿ some fuel from a busted petroleum pipeline would also be 
willing to burst the pipeline if he has the opportunity to do so (i.e., if he can do it without being observed).  This appears 
logical since bursting a pipeline or ￿tapping￿ fuel from a busted pipeline constitute the same offence under the existing 
Nigerian law. (ii) The individual who is willing to ￿tap￿ from a busted pipeline or burst a petroleum pipeline would also 
be willing to engage in a civil protest against the government or oil companies, whether such protest is peaceful or 
violent  (iii) An individual who is willing to engage in an armed struggle for self-determination will also be willing to 
￿tap￿ fuel from a petroleum pipeline if it can be done successfully (even if it is done with the intent to finance a justice-
seeking rebellion) and to take part in civil protests against the government and/or oil companies whether peaceful or 
violent.   
 
These assumptions yielded a kind of ordering as follows: If 3, then 2 and 1, If 2 then 1. It also provided a way of 
ascertaining the genuineness and consistency in the responses provided.  
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or rebellion. Also, while government appears to constrain participation in peaceful protests, it does not appear 
to statistically determine the propensity to violence or rebellion in the multinomial model.  
 
While different factors tend to explain the propensity to the different outcomes on civil disobedience and 
state-level differences appear to be significant, three factors (education,  income and asset) consistently 
explain the propensity to general violence as opposed to civil peace and peaceful protests in the two models.  
For example, a one unit increase in education (such as a movement from no formal education to complete 
primary education or from the latter to complete secondary education etc), other factors held constant, 
reduces the odds that an individual will participate in violent protest and associated criminality relative to 
peaceful protest by a factor of 0.66 (or 34 percent) and the odds that the individual will participate in an 
armed struggle relative to peaceful protest by a factor of 0.558 (or 44 percent) (Table 13).  Similarly a one 
unit increase in income (a movement from one income bracket to the upper level), other factors remaining the 
same, reduces the odds of participation in violent protest and associated criminality by a factor of 0.398 (or 
60 percent) and the odds of participating in rebellion by a factor of 0.573 (or 42 percent), while a movement 
from no asset to asset possession reduces the odds by a factor of 0.459 (or 54 percent). This corroborates the 
view that higher income and educational attainments reduce the risk of violence in resource-rich countries by 
increasing the opportunity cost of participation and encouraging political participation and the channeling of 
conflicts through institutional pathways (Collier and Hoefler, 2002a; Hegre, 2003).   
 
 
5.0 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Implications of Findings and Recommendations 
Nigeria as a nation faces two dimensions of oil-related conflict risk, each of which is capable of generating a 
civil war or a violent disintegration.  The first is the violent rent-seeking political conflicts that oil-availability 
and dependence generates between the various ethno-regional groups; the second is the Niger Delta crisis. 
With about 56.5 percent of the sampled population revealing a propensity to general violence as opposed to 
peaceful behaviour, sustainable civil peace may elude the region, and by extension, the country unless 
effective measures are taken to reduce this propensity.  
 
The first dimension of conflict is linked to excessive government dependence on oil revenues, an 
institutionally unstable revenue allocation system, weak political institutional arrangements, lack of effective 
agencies of restraints to demand transparency and accountability on the part of political office holders, and a 
defective property right structure in relation to mineral resource endowment. The second is attributable to 
weak institutional arrangements manifesting in poorly-conceived laws, lack of enforcement, ￿regulatory 
capture￿, and a marriage of interest between the Nigerian state and oil companies which often encourage the 
State to use repressive measures against oil communities in cases of disputes.    There are also the looting and  20
secession incentives, as well as the rent-seeking contests, that oil availability and the allure of ownership 
creates among local participants.  
 
Two factors appear to be fundamental in the recurring violent conflict between oil companies and local 
communities in the Niger Delta.   The first is communities￿ almost total dependence on oil companies for the 
provision of basic amenities and employment.  The second is the absence of an effective way of assessing 
damages occasioned by oil exploration and production activities and channelling compensation to the 
affected individuals or communities.  These have often put oil companies in dilemmas, encouraged them to 
use ￿divide and rule￿ tactics, and have generated bloody rent-seeking conflicts among individuals and parties 
in a community and between communities. Also, the operation of Joint Venture Contract (JVC) arrangements 
between the Nigerian government and oil companies has done much to increase the incidence of oil-related 
civil conflict in the region.  Quite apart from the fact that such contracts are uncommon among oil-producing 
countries and imposes huge financial responsibilities on the government, its operation has made oil 
companies in the country almost entirely involved in government administration.  In addition, reliance on oil 
companies to operate community development programmes under the JVCs (a responsibility they are not 
suited to fulfill) has made both Federal and State governments in the region to abandon their statutory 
responsibilities, and has bred corruption and lack of transparency on the part of oil companies and 
government officials. It has also deprived local communities of the much needed development.  
 
Overcoming the first dimension of conflict risk enjoins that the country to sincerely address some core 
challenges, which include reducing government￿s dependence on oil revenue through effective 
diversification, a deliberate focus on non-resource revenues, and reform of the tax system; tackling corruption 
and the lack of transparency and accountability in the management of oil wealth; dealing with patronage 
politics at all levels of government; and addressing the agitation for local (or increased local participation in 
the) ownership and control of mineral resources
27.  In relation to the second, efforts to reduce violent conflicts 
in the Niger Delta would be more effective if they also address the factors that increase individual￿s 
propensity to participate.  In this connection, measures that increase the opportunity cost of participation such 
                                                               
27 An effective tax system coupled with dependence on non-mineral tax revenues, rather than natural resource rents, has 
lots of benefits for a country￿s political economy.  First it promotes transparency and accountability on the part of 
government, since citizens are more concerned about what their taxes are used for.  Second it significantly reduces rent-
seeking violent contests among politicians, since there are little or no rents to loot.  Third and as a derivative of the 
above, it helps create a bond between government and citizens.   
Also transparency in the management of resource wealth is a requirement for civil peace. First it could help reduce 
misconceptions arising from exaggerated claims by potential rebel leaders about the economic gains from secession 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2002c).  For example, Aluko (2002) argues that the Nigerian government earns less than 25 
percent of the price of a barrel of crude oil after deducting oil-related expenses. Ross (2004) also mentions the large 
risks and huge up-front costs associated with the extraction of mineral resources. Secondly when citizens are able to see 
that the nation￿s resource wealth are not being transferred into private pockets, squandered or misappropriated, there is 
less likely to be resource-related protests.   21
as increasing formal educational attainment (human capital development) and increasing the income levels 
and asset endowment of the lower strata of society (most of which are not employed in formal settings and 
are likely to depend on the environmental resources for their livelihood) appear to be fundamental. In 
addition, the creation of the right set of institutional arrangements that clearly define the legally enforceable 
responsibilities of governments at the three levels and of oil companies in relation to the provision of public 
goods, social amenities, and employment to local communities and assigns oil revenue shares to each party in 
a way commensurate with assigned responsibilities; provide an effective way of channeling compensations 
and minimizing conflict between oil companies and communities; and promote property and human rights, 




The agitation for increased local control of mineral resources may also require the restructuring of property 
rights to such resources, for example, by the delegation of certain aspects of fiscal authority in oil matters to 
state and local governments (as in Ahmad and Mottu, 2003) or by transferring full property rights to onshore 
mineral resources to states and local communities, while the Federal government retains full ownership and 
control of offshore resources.  To ensure that individuals in local communities benefit from such a transfer 
and that it does not translate to increased rent-seeking conflicts at the local level, it  must be accompanied 
with the creation of restraining institutions at the local level and the targeting of oil spending to pro-poor 
activities
29. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
28 It will appear that a way to achieving a lasting peace in the Niger Delta would be to relieve oil companies of the 
responsibility of providing public goods (social amenities) to local communities and providing ￿employment￿ to the 
indigenes ￿at all cost￿. Rather, the Federal, State and Local governments should take on these responsibilities, even if 
the share of oil companies in oil revenue has to be reduced while oil companies are encouraged to fulfill other aspects of 
social responsibilities towards the communities in which they operate.   
 
Effective conflict management between oil companies and communities and between communities especially in the area 
of compensations for oil-related externalities may require the creation of an independent and statutory-empowered board 
with members drawn from oil-producing communities and from the civil society to assess damages associated with oil 
exploration and production, determine compensations and channel same to affected parties, and to mediate in disputes 
between oil companies and local communities. 
 
 
29 For example, resource-endowed states and local governments could be required by law to take up the EITI and PWYP 
initiatives.  The management and distribution of resource revenue could also be entrusted to an independent board with 
representations from all communities in the affected state and from the civil society.  As a way of control, the accounts 
of such boards can be subjected to regular external audit. As Ross (2004) suggested, this could be complemented with 
the establishment of an international system of performance-based ratings, similar to ratings produced by Transparency 
International (TI) to encourage improved practices.   
 
In relation to the use of oil wealth, Chad￿s oil revenue management law provides an example.  It spells out priority areas 
where oil revenues are to be spent. These are sectors typically associated with basic services for the population, such as 
education, health care, infrastructure, including roads and rural development (livestock, water and environment) (World 
Bank, 2005).  However, Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) appear to support a direct distribution of all oil proceeds 
to individuals.  As the authors argue, apart from removing lootable rents from the reach of politicians, such an 
arrangement also takes care of the volatility effects of resource rents on the economy. Ross (2003) also echoed an  22
CONCLUSION 
 
Even though this research work has focused on oil-dependence and civil conflict in Nigeria, the discussions 
and recommendations can be applied to mineral resources in general.   Like oil and gas, the exploration, 
production and dependence on other mineral resources are capable of generating civil conflicts through one 
or more of the mechanisms that have been highlighted in the study.  In general, Nigeria needs a detailed 
programme for the effective management and sustainable development of her vast mineral resources. Again, 
each of the policy implication drawn from the findings of the study throws up some challenges in the area of 
implementation which need to be carefully examined.  In sum it would require appropriate economic policies, 
institutional reforms and massive political will for the country to address the ￿resource curse￿ and to break 
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Table 1: Dimensions to Oil-dependence and Civil Conflict in Nigeria 
Conflict Level                   Goal          Instruments                              Actors  
 
1. National                   Control of oil                            Capture of political           Ethno-Regional                                  
  rents                                power at the centre                   Groups (ERGs) 
 
2. National  Increased share                          State creation,              ERGs, States                           
of revenue from                      Census manipulation,                           
                                    Federation account                  Manipulation of Revenue              
        A l l o c a t i o n   f o r m u l a  
 
3. National        Increased share                        Manipulation of Revenue             Oil-producing States,               
                                      of oil rents                               Allocation formula,                        Other States, 
           Local control of oil resources       Federal Government                                               
                  (￿Resource control￿)                             
 
4. Regional     Control of benefits from             Capture of Political power           Ethnic groups,   
        Property rights to land           at State and local government         Communities and                        
                   where oil production               levels, capture of traditional         Opinion leaders 
        activities take place                   and local authorities,             within the  
           Assertion of ownership                    Niger Delta         
                    rights to land  
  
5. Regional     Maximization of                 ￿Divide and Rule￿,           Oil companies,   
                                 Benefits from             Exploitation of weak            ethnic groups & 
        exploration and production             institutional arrangements,           communities                             
        activities                                      Regulatory capture,                     in the Niger Delta, 
                   Repression,             Federal government  
Civil disobedience, 
      Rebellion        




















Table 2: Operation Agreements between the Nigerian Government and Oil companies 
JOINT VENTURE CONTRACTS (JVCs)  PRODUCT SHARING CONTRACTS (PSCs) 
 
 
1. Partners share in cost of petroleum operations in 
the proportion of their equity share holding. 
 
2. Each partner can lift and separately dispose of its 
interest share of crude oil production, subject to 
payment (to Government) of petroleum profits tax, 
and royalty 
 
3. One of the partners is designated as the operator 
of the joint venture. 
 
4. The operator prepares and proposes programmes 
of work and budget of expenditure, for approval by 
NAPIMS, the major shareholder. 
 
5.  The operator has freedom of action in specific 
matters, and each party can opt for, and carry out 
sole risk operations. 
 
6.  The contractor pays no corporate tax on its 
profit. 
 
7. NNPC reserves the right to become operator  
 
8.  The commercial aspects of the agreement are 
covered in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU).  The current MOU provides the companies 
a guaranteed minimum profit of $2.30 per barrel 
after tax and royalty on their equity crude, and a 
reserves additional bonus, in any year that a 
company￿s addition to oil and condensate ultimate 
recovery exceeds production for that year. 
 
1. The contract areas for the OPL￿s are located in 
deep offshore or inland basin. 
 
2. The term of the PSC is for a period of 30 years, 
inclusive of 10 year exploration period. 
 
3.  The contractor bears all the cost of exploration, 
and if oil is found, also bears the cost of subsequent 
development and production of operations.  If no oil 
is found, the contractor is not reimbursed for 
exploration expenses.   
 
4. Crude oil produced is allocated as follows 
          Tax Oil- This is to offset tax, royalty, and     
concession rentals due to government 
            Cost Oil ￿ This is for reimbursement to the 
contractor for capital investment and operating up to 
certain limits. 
     Profit Oil-   The balance after deduction of tax 
oil and cost oil elements will be shared between the 




Source:  NNPC, 2005.  
Notes: JVCs are uncommon among oil producing countries in general.  Nigeria provides an exception.  Rather, PSCs are 
attractive to governments as they avoid risks (Gary and Karl, 2003).  The NNPC has also not been able to meet its share 
of maintenance and running costs associated with the JVCs. For example, lack of arrears payments and finance from 
NNPC to joint venture partners, amounting to N26 billion, led to a drop in exploration and production activities by the 
oil companies in 2002 (This Day, Nov 18, 2002). PSCs were particularly introduced in 1991 to alleviate the 
organization￿s funding problems, but production under this arrangement is still limited (an estimated 3 percent of total as 





Table 3: Legislation to Protect Communities, compiled for the NDES-Commissioned Report in 1996 
Legislation Areas       Laws/ Regulations                                       Degrees of Community Protection  
 
Noise                 - Workmen Compensation Act 1990                      Zero Enforcement  
                           - State Environmental Sanitation Edicts                 Inadequate laws 
                           - Factory Act                                                                   
                           -  FEPA and SEPA Decrees &Edict                               
 
Wildlife              - Endengered Species Act Cap 108 LFN* 1990    Weak Enforcement  
Conservation      - Natural Resources Conservation Council Act 
                              Cap 286 LFN 1990                                               Inadequate Laws 
-  Forestry Law 
                                                               
Pest Control        - Public Health Laws                                             Laws are antiquated in terms of                          
                            - FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990                             penalties, implementation and  
                                                                                                           Application, and have been  
                                                                                                           dropped in the present laws of  
                                                                                                           the federation       
Fishery               - Fisheries Act Cap 404 LFN 1990                        Zero Enforcement,  
                                                                                                           poor co-ordination and  
                                                                                                           inadequate laws 
 
Water                 - Mineral Oil (Safety)Act Cap 350 LFN 1990       Inadequate, antiquated and finally       
                           - Mineral Resources Act Cap 226 LFN 1990        omitted in the Federal Laws but  
                           - Oil in Navigable water Act cap 339 LFN 1990   still effective in Delta state 
                           - Petroleum Act Cap 350 LFN 1990                       Colonial and not in use [sic] 
                           -River Basins development Authorities 
                            (RBDA) Act Cap 396 LFN 1990                          Weak Enforcement, do not  
                           -FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990                              favour local communities  
 
Land                   -Land Use Act Cap 202 LFN 1990                        Favour and protect interest of  
                           - Handful Wastes Act Cap 16 SLFN 1990             government and not communities 
                           -Natural Resources Conservation Council Act       
                            Cap 131 LFN 1990 
                           -FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990                              Not properly enforced 
 
Industry              -FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990                             Not properly enforced 
                           -Harmful wastes Act Cap 165 LFN 1990             FEPA not equipped to enforce regulation                               
                           -Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)            Provisions to witch hunt communities 
                            Decree 1992, No.86                                               and rob them of right to compensate  
                           -SEPA Edicts                                                          i.e., through claims of sabotage 
 
Oil and               -Petroleum Act Cap 350 LFN 1990                       Did not adopt environmental considerations     
Harzadous          -Petroleum (Drilling and Production)                    and hence cannot protect communities￿ interests  
Substance            Regulation 1969 
                         -Associated Gas Re-Injection Act                            Not Effective 
                          Cap 20  LFN 1990 
 
Sanitation         -Public Health Law                                                 Antiquated 
-Environmental Sanitation Edicts                       Weak enforcement    
-FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990                           Weak enforcement 
                 Air                     -FEPA Decree No. 56 of 198 
 
    *LFN stands for Laws of the Federation of Nigeria.   Source: Ogbnigwe (1996:16-17); Frynas   (2000:91).        
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    Table 4: Comparative Indicators: Oil and Macroeconomic Instability in Nigeria 
                                                        Nigeria       Oil Producing       Developing     All Countries  
                                                                               Countries           Countries  
 
Per capita GDP, PPP, 1998               955                3,579                   2,076            3,029 
 
Standard deviation of growth  
Of per capita GDP                          0.1465             0.111                   0.078            0.0703 
 
Coefficient of variation                   0.110             0.101                    0.051            0.040  
             






OIL= Oil Revenue (Gross) (consist of exports and domestic Oil Revenue), CIT= Companies Income Tax 
CED= Customs & Excise Duties, IRFG= Independent Revenue of Federal Government (incl. GSM)  

















Fig 1: Nigerian Federation Account: Main Revenue Sources (2003 Estimates)  30
Table 5: Comparative Institutional Quality: Nigeria and Selected Countries and Country groups  
 
                   VA           PS          GE        RQ        ROL       COC  
 
Benin              0.03        -0.63       -0.62      -0.56      -0.42       -0.61  
Botswana        0.73         0.75        0.87        0.81       0.72        0.76     
Ghana             0.01        -0.11        0.01      -0.29      -0.51        -0.40  
Nigeria          -0.70       -1.49       -1.12      -1.18      -1.35        -1.35 
Senegal           0.15         0.25       -0.18      -0.22      -0.20        -0.17 
Tanzania         0.41        -0.25       -0.51      -0.55      -0.49        -1.0   
LIC               -0.73        -0.78       -0.76      -0.78      -0.81        -0.76 
SSA              -0.70        -0.70       -0.73      -0.71      -0.76        -0.68 
KEY: VA= Voice and Accountability; PS= Political stability, GE= Government Effectiveness; RQ=Regulatory Quality; 
ROL=Rule of law; COC= Control of Corruption.  LIC= Low Income Countries; SSA= Sub-Saharan African Countries. 
Indices for LIC and SSA are by Author￿s Calculation and represent averages. LIC countries are based on World Bank 
classification. Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2003(2002 estimates). 
 
 
Table 6: Political Economy of Revenue Sharing in Nigeria 
Region                   No of States              Federal Transfers                Average Transfer           
                                                             Per capital as % of total           Per capita (Naira) 
                                                                        (1998)                                 (1998) 
 
East                             9                                  23.63                                   676   
North                          18                                52.22                                   747 
West                            9                                  24.15                                   691 
 




























Table 7: Policy and Institutional Factors in the Causes of Violent Conflicts (Selected cases)  
S/N IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT, 








Demand for social infrastructure (water, light, 
roads, schools, hospitals) from oil companies.  
E.g.  Edagberi/Better land community, Rivers 
State, and SPDC, 1998), (Edagberi, Biseni, Idu, 
Mbiama communities, Rivers State SPDC, 2005), 
(Akinima community, Rivers State and 
SPDC/Agip, 1997/2002), (Imiringi community, 
Bayelsa State and SPDC, 1999,2000), 
(Gbarantoru community, Bayelsa State  and 
SPDC, 2001, 2005), (Eleme Alesa community, 
Rivers State and Federal Government, 2005), 
(Biseni community, Bayelsa State and SPDC, 
1996).                                                       
 
Failure of state to 
provide public goods 
and infrastructure 
 
Failure of oil 
companies to honour 
MOUs 
          
 
Absence of well defined ￿rules 
of the game￿ (i.e, who is 






2.  Demand for employment from oil Companies 
(Edagberi/Better Land community, Rivers State, 
and SPDC, 2004), (Afiesere community, Delta 
State and Shell, 2004), (Evremi community, Delta 
State and SPDC, 2004), Biseni community, 
Bayelsa State and SPDC, 1996).  
Failure of state and 
private sector to create 
employment 
opportunities 




Environmental damages and failure to get 
redress through established courts. (E.g. 
Ekakpame community, Delta State and SPDC, 
1999),  (Edagberi/Better Land community, Rivers 





environmental regulation and   
compensation mechanism 
Weakness of Legal 
Arrangements for conflict 
resolution 
 (Sometimes oil companies do 
not obey court orders) 
4 
 
Competition among local communities and 
between groups in a local community for 
benefits from oil companies.  E.g. (Edagberi, 
Biseni, Idu, Mbiama   communities, Rivers State 
SPDC, 2005), Afiesere community, Delta State 
and SPDC, 1999) , (Obotobo 2 community, Delta 
State and SPDC, 1998), (Ugbolu, Asaba 
communities,2003/4), Evremi community, Delta 
State and SPDC, 1999), (Join-Krama 3, Edagberi 
communities, Rivers State, and SPDC, Agip, 
2005), (Obioma and Obioku communities, Rivers 
State and SPDC, 2005), (Biseni and Agbere 
communities, Bayelsa State and SPDC, 1995).    
                 
Improper channeling of 
benefits to communities   
 
Failure of state to 
provide public goods 
and infrastructure 
 
Failure of state and 
private sector to create 
employment 
opportunities        
 
State (Governance) failure 
Economic Policy failure 
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Note: Based on Author￿s survey. SPDC is Shell Petroleum Development Company, Nigeria.  MOU is Memorandum of 
Understanding, a form of social contract between oil company and host community. Examples are drawn from selected 
communities. Source: Author￿s Field Survey, March- April 2005.  
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics 
    Variable                         Mean        Std. Dev.  
 civildisobedience               1.804         1.062        
   education                         1.516         0.747        
      income                          0.994         1.408        
       asset                             0.671         0.470        
 studentship                         0.347         0.482        
         Oil                               0.611         0.488       
  government                       0.389          0.756       
   inclusion                          3.689          1.939       
unemployment                     0.281          0.469      
infrastructure                      8.305          5.049       
    conflict                            1.610          1.458       
Table 9: Respondents￿ Answers to the Question: What is your most pressing need?  
  Frequency Percentage 
1.     A job or business that  can provide enough income for self and family   
658 48.89 
2.     Provision of electricity/water, road to respondent￿s community
349 25.93 
3.     Respondent community be allowed to own and manage the oil and 
         Gas  resources in its land  324 24.07 
4.     Others 
14 1.11 
Source: Author￿s Field Survey, March- August 2005   
 
 
Table 10: Access to Basic Amenities and availability of Social Infrastructure in  
                                   Surveyed Communities 
 
   Amenities                                                                              Fraction of Communities Surveyed 
                    Bayelsa    Delta     Rivers           
          Water 
          Private Connection to pipeline                                                               0/6        0/6           0/6 
          Private well/borehole                                                                              0/6        5/6           0/6 
          Centrally located taps/borehole                                                              0/6        1/6           0/6 
          Others (Neighbors goodwill, water vendors, rain, streams/ rivers)       6/6        0/6            6/6 
         Electricity 
          Provided by Federal government                                                           0/6        5/6           0/6    
          Provided by State government                                                               2/6        0/6            0/6 
          Provided by Oil Company                                                                      3/6       1/6            3/6 
          No Electricity (kerosene/gas lamp/candles/battery flashlights etc)       1/6       0/6            3/6  
 
         Toilet    
           Flush Toilet (include non-automated flush type)                        0/6      5/6            0/6  
           Others (Pit latrine, bowl bucket, No toilet)                                            6/6      1/6            6/6 
       Aggregate Measurement of Social Infrastructure (tarred roads, functional      
       Public hospitals, schools etc) (Community Average)                                8.7     5.58        10.58 
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Table 11: Ordered Logit Regresion on civildisobedience 
                       (1)                (2)            (3)             (4)            (5)            (6)           (7)        
income                       -0.466          -0.468        -0.467       -0.423      -0.426      -0.396      0.673 
                                   (0.061)        (0.061)       (0.061)     (0.047)    (0.047)      (0.042)    (0.028) 
Delta                            1.334           1.343         1.291         1.298     1.364        1.370       3.934 
                                   (0.169)        (0.168)       (0.154)     (0.154)    (0.145)      (0.145)    (0.569)  
oil                                0.620          0.607          0.657        0.670       0.654         0.641      1.898  
                                   (0.134)       (0.131)       (0.115)      (0.115)    (0.114)      (0.114)    (1.215) 
Asset                            -0.634         -0.633        -0.634       -0.651     -0.630      -0.640       0.527 
                                   (0.117)       (0.117)       (0.117)      (0.116)    (0.114)      (0.114)      0.060 
Education                    -0.382         -0.382        -0.384       -0.391     -0.382        -0.359      0.698 
                                   (0.097)       (0.097)       (0.097)      (0.097)    (0.096)      (0.095)     (0.066) 
infrastructure              -0.039         -0.038        -0.040       -0.040     -0.042        -0.043       0.958 
                                   (0.012)       (0.012)       (0.012)      (0.012)    (0.011)       (0.011)    (0.011) 
Inclusion                     -0.062        -0.063         -0.060       -0.059     -0.057        -0.076       0.927 
                                   (0.039)       (0.039)       (0.039)      (0.039)    (0.038)       (0.036)      0.034  
studentship                  -0.310       -0.312         -0.294       -0.170     -0.188  
                                   (0.173)      (0.173)        (0.171)      (0.130)    (0.129) 
Rivers                           -0.172       -0.176         -0.175        -0.156          
                                   (0.129)      (0.128)        (0.128)      (0.127)         
unemployment           -0.191        -0.189         -0.186                  
                                   (0.166)      (0.166)        (0.166)                 
conflict                        0.030         0.035                           
                                   (0.045)      (0.043)                         
government                 -0.030                                  
                                   (0.073)                                 
    τ1                             -3.764       -3.751         -3.790        -3.650     -3.577      -3.537 
                                   (0.263)       0.216           0.256        (0.223)    (0.215)    (0.213) 
    τ2                                           -1.746       -1.732           -1.773        -1.638    -1.563      -1.527 
                                  (0.243)      (0.241)         (0.236)       (0.202)    (0.193)    (0.191) 
    τ3                           -0.706       -0.693           -0.734        -0.599     -0.524      -0.488 
                                  (0.240)      (0.237)         (0.232)       (0.198)    (0.188)     (0.186) 
Observations               1347          1347            1347           1347       1347         1347 
Pseudo R
2                     0.102          0.102         0.102          0.102       0.101        0.100 
Log likelihood        -1585.98      -1586.06    -1586.38       1587.0    -1587.76  -1588.82 
 
Notes: Columns (2) through (6) progressively omit the least significant variable from previous model.  (6) contains only 
variables that are significant at the conventional 5% level.  (7) reports odd ratios for the statistically significant variables.  
The τs are the ancillary parameter estimates of the thresholds or cutpoints that separates between the various outcomes.  
Standard errors in parenthesis.  











Table 12: Ordered Logit Regresion on civildisobedience 
                                         Multinomial Logit                              
                                       (1)                 (2)             (3)               
                                 Peacepro         violence        rebellion       
Education                    0.002             -0.414*        -0.582**       
                                  (0.182)            (0.200)        (0.185)        
income                        -0.061           -0.983**      -0.619**     
                                   (0.094)           (0.154)        (0.109)        
asset                            -0.245           -0.544*        -1.024**     
                                   (0.232)           (0.246)        (0.230)        
studentship                 -0.354            -1.512**      -0.520          
                                   (0.294)           (0.376)        (0.306)       
unemployment            0.782*          -0.464           0.308          
                                   (0.345)           (0.414)        (0.355)       
Inclusion                     -0.030           -0.143          -0.107          
                                   (0.065)           (0.079)        (0.067)      
oil                  -0.404            -0.267           0.625**       
                                   (0.234)           (0.262)        (0.240)       
government                 0.332*            0.250          0.127          
                                   (0.133)           (0.152)        (0.142)      
Infrastructure               0.017              0.019        -0.051*       
                                   (0.021)           (0.023)        (0.022)      
conflict                        0.270**          0.289**      0.196*      
                                   (0.082)           (0.090)        (0.087)       
delta                           -0.365              0.734*        1.575**      
                                   (0.307)           (0.355)        (0.320)       
rivers                          -0.881**        -0.052         -0.647*       
                                   (0.239)           (0.264)       (0.258)      
Observations                1347              1347           1347           
Pseudo R
2               0.153                                                            
Log likelihood       -1497.059                                                      
 
Note: Outcome civildisobedience = 0 is the comparison group.  




Table 13: Effects of educational attainment, Income level and Asset possession on the odds of 
participation in violence and armed struggle relative to peaceful protest  
 
  Violence   Rebellion
education  0.660 0.558
Income  0.398 0.573
Asset  0.742 0.459
  
 
 
 
 
 
 